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Can Capitalism Survive under
Communist Rule? The Effect of Hong
Kong's Reversion to the People's
Republic of China in 1997
I. Historical Perspective
In 1997, after 155 years of British rule, Hong Kong will revert to Chinese
rule.' This comment addresses the effects of this transfer of sovereignty in the
period leading up to 1997 and attempts to envision what Hong Kong will look
like after 1997.
Britain has officially occupied Hong Kong since 1841.2 Throughout its long
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1. Anthony Neoh, Hong Kong's Future: The View of a Hong Kong Lawyer, 22 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 309, 310 (1991-1992).
2. Britain hoisted its flag on the island, established a colony, and began development of a
commercial seaport. Johnson C. Ng, Hong Kong After 1997: An Experimental Government Practicing
Capitalism Within a Socialist Sovereign, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 67, 69 (1989). Hong
Kong was ceded to the British Crown by China's Qing government in 1842, under the terms of the
Treaty of Nanking, which concluded the First Opium War. Perry Keller, Freedom of the Press in
Hong Kong: Liberal Values and Sovereign Interests, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 371, 373 n.3 (1992) (citing 1
PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG 33-43 (1987).
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tenure, Britain has asserted its sovereignty over the colony on the basis of conquest
and the subsequent treaties of cession and lease granted by the imperial govern-
ment of China.3 When the People's Republic of China was formed, Chinese
leaders took the position that the treaties were invalid because Britain obtained
them through force.4 The People's Republic of China further asserted that the
parties had been on unequal footing both economically and politically, and the
result was a treaty containing inequitable terms. 5 Subsequently, "one of the
major goals of the Nationalist Revolution (in China) was to abrogate the 'unequal
treaties' and to recover Chinese territories lost to foreign countries."'
Every leader of modem China has regarded it as his historical mission to end
extraterritorial privileges in China and to abolish unequal treaties.7 This sense
of historical mission is key to understanding Chinese behavior toward the question
of Hong Kong. 8 Extraterritoriality gained a foothold in China following the Opium
War.9 Britain, in an effort to balance its trade deficit with China, had begun to
import opium in exchange for Chinese goods.10 Lin Tse-Hsu, the Chinese Special
Commissioner, was given the mission of eradicating the evils of opium from
China. He addressed a letter to Queen Victoria that contained this proposition:
"Suppose there were people from another country who carried opium for sale
to England and seduced your people into buying and smoking it; certainly your
Under the terms of the First Convention of Peking, Kowloon and Stonecutters Island were also ceded
to Britain in 1860. Id. The final territorial addition to the colony occurred in 1898 with the ratification
of the Second Convention of Peking, in which Britain received a 99-year lease over the outlying
area of Hong Kong known as the New Territories. Id. Hong Kong Island, the New Territories,
Kowloon Peninsula, and Stonecutters Island comprise modem Hong Kong. Patricia Homan Palumbo,
Comment, Analysis of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of Hong Kong: What
Do They Guarantee the People of Hong Kong After 1997?, 6 CONN. J. INT-L L. 667, 670 (1991).
These areas have become so interdependent that separate treatment of them is not practically feasible.
Id.
3. Keller, supra note 2, at 373.
4. Id. War was not considered to be an unlawful means of resolving international disputes until
the nineteenth century when the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War was signed and later
adopted by the United Nations Charter of 1945. Neoh, supra note 1, at 318-19. The Chinese view
of Hong Kong's status was made clear in a letter to the chairman of the United Nations Special
Committee concerning the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples in March 1972. The letter maintained that the settlement of the
question of Hong Kong was a matter of China's sovereign right and that consequently Hong Kong
should not be included in the list of colonial territories covered by the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. People's Republic of China-United Kingdohm:
Agreement on the Future of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, in 23 I.L.M. 1366, 1367 (1984) (reproduced
from the White Paper published by Her Majesty's Government in London on September 26, 1984,
as reproduced by the Government Printer in Hong Kong) [hereinafter White Paper].
5. Neoh, supra note 1, at 318; see also Palumbo, supra note 2, at 671.
6. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 671.
7. Neoh, supra note 1, at 315.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 669; Ng, supra note 2, at 69 (citing HONG KONG Gov'T INFO.
SERVICES, HONG KONG 1987, at 1, 295 (1987)).
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honorable ruler would deeply hate it and be bitterly aroused."" In response to
China's prohibition on the import of opium, Britain sent an expeditionary force
into China. 12 Subsequent actions sparked the Opium War that ended with the
signing of the Treaty of Nanking.' 3 The Treaty of Nanking ceded Hong Kong
Island to Great Britain.1
4
Yet, despite this deep sense of historical mission, China did not demand the
return of Hong Kong, but chose to wait for Britain to make the first move. 5
Although China continually asserted that Hong Kong was Chinese territory, it
stated it would wait until conditions were ripe before making a move to reclaim
Hong Kong.16 Many Westerners believe that China needed Hong Kong as an
enclave to deal with foreigners and for the foreign exchange that Hong Kong
brings to China.'7 In 1979 Britain broached the subject of the territorial leases that
were due to expire in 1997.'" Discussions between China and Britain continued on
the subject until 1983, when "it became clear that the continuation of British
administration after 1997 would not be acceptable to China in any form. "'9
II. The Hand-off
A. THE SINO-BRITISH JOINT DECLARATION
Once it became clear that China was ready to reassert its sovereignty over
Hong Kong, negotiations began between Britain and China to reach some sort
of agreement regarding Hong Kong's future.20 Britain's goal was to ensure the
stability and prosperity of Hong Kong.2' The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the
Question of Hong Kong went into effect on May 27, 1985. 22The Joint Declaration
articulates China's policy of "one country, two systems.- 23 It provides that Hong
Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
11. Neoh, supra note 1, at 315-16.
12. Id. at 316.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see also Palumbo, supra note 2, at 670.
15. Neoh, supra note 1, at 320.
16. White Paper, supra note 4, at 1367; Palumbo, supra note 2, at 671.
17. Neoh, supra note 1, at 320.
18. White Paper, supra note 4, at 1367.
19. Id. at 1368.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The Joint Declaration was ratified by the British Parliament in March 1985 and by the Third
Session of the Sixth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on April 10,
1985. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 673. The Joint Declaration includes the declaration itself, three
annexes, and an exchange of memoranda between Britain and China. Id. The three annexes are:
Annex I, Elaboration by the Government of the People's Republic of China of Its Basic Policies
Regarding Hong Kong; Annex II, Sino-British Joint Liaison Group; and Annex III, Land Leases.
Id.
23. Keller, supra note 2, at 389.
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China and that "[t]he current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will
remain unchanged, and so will the lifestyle."
24
Britain's bargaining power was weakened in negotiations by China's insistence
that if an agreement between them were not reached, China would unilaterally
determine Hong Kong's fate.25 Furthermore, a wide gulf separated the negotiators
in their interpretation of key concepts.26 Britain's attempts to clarify issues through
further discussion have met with accusations from China that Britain is not abiding
by its bargains.27
The Joint Declaration is viewed as a treaty by the British government, the
present Hong Kong government, and the United Nations. 28 The Declaration was
registered with the United Nations by both the British and Chinese governments.29
As a treaty, the Joint Declaration creates a legal duty under international law
that obligates China to maintain a capitalistic system in Hong Kong for fifty years
after the exchange in sovereignty in 1997. 30 The Chinese view the continued
existence of a capitalist society in Hong Kong as an act of sovereign grace,
expressed in an international agreement in the form of a declaration. 3 But, because
China has for so long viewed Hong Kong as primarily a domestic matter, observers
24. White Paper, supra note 4, at 1372. China's Constitution provides that: "The state may
establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special
administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in light
of the specific conditions." P.R.C. CONST. art. 31, reprinted in IV CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF THE WORLD 35, 43 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992).
25. See Palumbo, supra note 2, at 673. As stated in the White Paper, supra note 4:
Her Majesty's Government have a duty to make clear beyond any possibility of misun-
derstanding the alternative to acceptance of the agreement set out in this White Paper.
In their view, there is no possibility of an amended agreement. The alternative to
acceptance of the present agreement is to have no agreement. In this case the Chinese
Government has made it plain that negotiations could not be reopened and that it would
publish its own plan for Hong Kong. There is no guarantee that such a unilateral plan
would include all the elements included in the draft agreement, nor would it have the
same status as a legally binding agreement between the two countries. Whether or
not there is an agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the Chinese Govern-
ment, the New Territories will revert to China on 1 July 1997 under the terms of the
1898 Convention. The remainder of Hong Kong (Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and
Stonecutters Island) would not be viable alone. Hong Kong, including the New Territor-
ies, has since 1898 become an integral whole and Her Majesty's Government are
satisfied that there is no possibility of dividing the New Territories which revert to
China on 1 July 1997 from the remainder. The choice is therefore between reversion
of Hong Kong to China under agreed, legally binding international arrangements or
reversion to China without such arrangements. This is not a choice which her Majesty's
Government have sought to impose on the people of Hong Kong. It is a choice imposed
by the facts of Hong Kong's history.
White Paper, supra note 4, at 1370.
26. Neoh, supra note 1, at 329.
27. Id. at 329-30.
28. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 691.
29. Id. at 674.
30. Id. at 692.
31. Keller, supra note 2, at 387.
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fear that after 1997 the Chinese will not view the Joint Declaration with the same
regard normally given an international treaty.32 China's history of abiding by
domestic agreements is considerably worse than its history of honoring interna-
tional agreements.33
One commentator has compared the Joint Declaration to China's agreement
with Tibet and concluded that "China will probably break its promise of main-
taining capitalism in Hong Kong.'' 34 In 1951 China entered into an agreement
with Tibet for the "peaceful liberation of Tibet." 35 Under this agreement Tibet
became a National Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China as
provided for in article 30(1) of the Chinese Constitution. 36 This agreement, like
the Joint Declaration, promised the people of Tibet the right to regional autonomy.
Yet, instead of enjoying the independence that they were promised, the Tibetans
have suffered oppression, violence, and poverty under Chinese rule.37
However, differences do exist between the Hong Kong and Tibet situations.
Tibet is classified as a National Autonomous Region under article 30(1) of China's
Constitution, while Hong Kong is classified as a Special Administrative Region
under article 31 of the Constitution." In addition, in Hong Kong's case a third
party, Britain, is involved in the agreement. These distinctions, plus the fact that
Hong Kong is a prosperous financial and business center, may give China more
reason to uphold Hong Kong's autonomy. 39 "To maintain economic prosperity
in the region, China will have to continue assuring the international community
that Hong Kong is a safe place to live and invest, otherwise Hong Kong's well-
known affluence will be lost, as will China's future share in it. " 4
32. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 687.
33. Id. at 687-88. And China's history of honoring international agreements has not always been
good. Id. China has not respected its agreements to import wheat from the United States and has
broken other international agreements with American companies. Id. at 695. Nevertheless, one
commentator notes that China's record for honoring its commitments is "unusually strong." William
H. Overholt, Hong Kong and China after 1997: The Real Issues, in THE CHINA CHALLENGE: AMERI-
CAN POLICIES IN EAST ASIA, 38 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE No. 2, at
31, 32 (1991). This disparity of opinion is explained by the fact that China tends to write agreements
that are subject to considerable variations of interpretation. Id.
34. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 696 (citing Chiu, The 1984 Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong
and Its Implications on China's Unification, 21 ISSUES & STUDIES 13 (1985)).
35. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 696.
36. Id.
37. Id. In September 1987 Tibetan Buddist monks demonstrated in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital,
protesting China's mistreatment of the religious and political population. Ng, supra note 2, at 80-81
(citing Edward A. Gargan, Chinese Leader Faults U.S. Lawmakers on Tibet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
1987, at 32, cols. 1-3). After an angry crowd of Tibetans burned down a police station, the Chinese
government responded by banning processions around one of Tibet's holiest Buddhist temples. Id.
In addition, China refused to let any Western reporters cover the incident. Id. When the United
States Congressional Human Rights Caucus requested permission to visit Tibet, Chinese authorities
refused to grant permission. Id.
38. P.R.C. CONST., supra note 24, arts. 30, 31.
39. Palumbo, suora note 2, at 697.
40. Id.
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The Joint Declaration is a remarkable document. According to the terms of the
agreement, China will allow Hong Kong to maintain virtually all systems currently
in place.4 In some respects Hong Kong is actually granted more authority than the
colony had under British rule.42 The Joint Declaration provides that: (1) Hong Kong
will become a Special Administrative Region of China, and through enactment of
the Basic Law, China will stipulate that the socialist system and socialist policies
shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and that
Hong Kong's previous capitalist system and life-style shall remain unchanged for
fifty years;43 (2) Hong Kong shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy;"4 (3) except
for foreign and defense matters, Hong Kong will have executive, legislative, and
independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication; 45 (4) the laws pre-
viously in force in Hong Kong shall be maintained; 4" (5) the courts of Hong Kong
shall exercise judicial power independently and free from any interference; 47 (6)
Hong Kong shall use its financial revenues exclusively for its own purposes and
they shall not be handed over to China;48 (7) Hong Kong shall maintain the capitalist
economic and trade systems previously in place and shall decide economic and trade
policies on its own ;49 (9) the monetary and financial systems previously practiced in
Hong Kong, including the systems of regulation and supervision of deposit-taking
institutions and financial markets, shall be maintained; s° (10) Hong Kong may
maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with
states, regions, and relevant international organizations; 5 1 (11) international
agreements to which China is not a party but which are implemented in Hong Kong
may remain in effect; 52 (12) the maintenance of public order shall be the responsibil-
ity of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, and Chinese
military forces stationed in Hong Kong will be for the purpose of defense and will
not interfere in the internal affairs of Hong Kong; 53 (13) Hong Kong shall maintain
the rights and freedoms as provided for by the laws previously in force in Hong
Kong, including freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of association;
5 4
and (14) holders of valid travel documents shall be free to leave Hong Kong without
55special authorization.
41. See generally White Paper, supra note 4.
42. Id.
43. Id. annex I, art. I.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. art. II.
47. Id. art. III.
48. Id. art. V.
49. Id. art. VI.
50. Id.
51. Id. art. XI.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. XII.
54. Id. art. XIII.
55. Id. art. XIV.
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Upon first reading, each of the above declarations gives concrete reassurance
that nothing will really change in Hong Kong after the transfer to China in 1997.
A second, closer reading lessens the feeling of reassurance. Some statements in
the Joint Declaration are prefaced with qualification; many key concepts are
nebulous. For example, the Joint Declaration states that China will allow Hong
Kong to maintain "a high degree of autonomy." 56 Autonomy denotes the ability
to make decisions independent of any external influence.57 But this meaning was
qualified with the words "high degree."-58 As one commentator noted, "there
is no complete autonomy. The [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region] is
a creation of the National People's Congress under Article 31 of the 1982 Constitu-
tion. It is especially true in the PRC, what is created by one law can be struck
down by another." 59 The Joint Declaration also states that Hong Kong will keep
the law previously in force: "the common law, rules of equity, ordinances,
subordinate legislation and customary law.' 60 Yet, this provision too is qualified
by the statement "save for any that contravene the Basic Law."
61
B. THE BASIC LAW
The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was adopted
by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China in April
1990 and becomes effective on July 1, 1997.62 The Basic Law is intended to give
legal effect to the provisions of the Joint Declaration.63 To a large extent, the
security of Hong Kong's future is dependent on China's willingness to follow
the Basic Law. 64
56. Id. at 1371.
57. Neoh, supra note 1, at 332-33.
58. Id. at 333.
59. Id. (footnote omitted). The National People's Congress (NPC) is China's legislative body
and as provided in the Chinese Constitution, "the highest organ of state power." Palumbo, supra
note 2, at 679.
60. White Paper, supra note 4, at 1373.
61. Id.
62. The NPC appointed the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) in June 1985. In March
1990 the BLDC submitted the Final Draft of the Basic Law. Neoh, supra note 1, at 330. The BLDC
consisted of fifty-eight members, with twenty-three drawn from a cross-section of the Hong Kong
community. Id. However, after June 4, 1989, two of its members resigned, and two others did not
attend the proceedings, reducing the Hong Kong contingent to nineteen. Id. The four members who
left the BLDC, Bishop Kwong, Louis Cha, Martin Lee, and Szeto Wah, were among the liberal
wing of the Hong Kong contingent; their departure left Hong Kong's representation heavily weighted
in favor of the business community. Id.
The BLDC then established a consultative committee in Hong Kong comprising one hundred and
fifty members, representing a cross-section of Hong Kong. Id. at 331. The chairman of the BLDC,
Mr. Ji Peng Fei, a state councilor and the head of the Hong Kong and Macao Office in the State
Council of China, appointed the committee's members. Id. "From the start the drafting and consulta-
tive processes were orchestrated by the Chinese government." Id.
63. See Palumbo, supra note 2, at 694.
64. Id.
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Many of the policies concerning the transfer of sovereignty from Britain to
China are not addressed in a specific manner in the Joint Declaration.65 Instead,
China asserted control over the interpretation and implementation of the Joint
Declaration through article 3(12) of that agreement. 6 Under article 3 of the Joint
Declaration the Chinese government agreed to stipulate its policies regarding the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in legislation enacted by China's
National People's Congress.67 China fulfilled this initial obligation by enacting
the Basic Law.68
Since the Basic Law was enacted, many people have protested that it does not
comply with the Joint Declaration. 69 For example, in the Joint Declaration, Hong
Kong was vested with executive, legislative, and independent judicial power.70
However, in article 17 of the Basic Law, the Standing Committee of China's
National People's Congress has the power to invalidate laws that in their opinion
do not comply with the Basic Law. 71 Article 158 of the Basic Law also undermines
the Joint Declaration's provision for an independent judiciary. Article 158 states
that whenever a decision concerning a Basic Law provision that affects the central
government is before the Hong Kong courts, they must consult with the Standing
Committee. As the Basic Law is similar to a constitution governing Hong Kong
after 1997, stripping the courts of the authority to interpret the Basic Law effec-
tively removes the independent judiciary.73
Currently, the Joint Liaison Group is reviewing all of Hong Kong's laws to
make sure they are consistent with both the language and the substantive provisions
of the Basic Law. 74 Hong Kong's Attorney General stated that there are about
600 ordinances in the statute book, and the majority will require change in varying
degrees.75 One half of the ordinances in question are based on U.K. enactments,
65. Id. at 695.
66. Keller, supra note 2, at 388.
67. Id.; White Paper, supra note 4, at 1372.
68. Keller, supra note 2, at 388; see also Neoh, supra note 1, at 327.
69. Neoh, supra note 1, at 329.
70. White Paper, supra note 4, at 1371.
71. People's Republic of China: The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People's Republic of China (pt. 3), 29 I.L.M. 1519, 1522 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
72. Id. at 1544; see also Palumbo, supra note 2, at 708.
73. See Palumbo, supra note 2, at 708.
74. Christine Loh, Why We Must Lay Down the Law to Avoid a "Black Hole," S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 17, 1993, at 15 (Christine Loh is an appointed member of Hong Kong's
Legislative Council). The establishment of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group was provided for
in Annex II of the Joint Declaration. Representatives from Britain and China are members of the
group. The functions of the Joint Liaison Group are: to conduct consultations on the implementation
of the Joint Declaration, to discuss matters relating to the smooth transfer of government in 1997,
and to exchange information and conduct consultations on such subjects as may be agreed by the
two sides. White Paper, supra note 4, annex II, arts. 1, 6. The Joint Liaison Group is an "organ
for liaison and not an organ of power. It shall play no part in the administration of Hong Kong or
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." Id. The group was formed when the Joint Declaration
went into force and is supposed to continue working until January 1, 2000. Id.
75. Loh, supra note 74, at 15.
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and in order to replace them a Hong Kong ordinance must be passed before July
1, 1997.76 If China withholds cooperation, matters as basic as the validity of
marriages and the basis on which land is leased will be left unresolved and open
to political manipulation."
Of the 600 ordinances needing review, two hundred are international treaties,
and many of the remainder are important bilateral agreements .78 The multilateral
treaties, applied to Hong Kong through extension by Britain, deal with such
areas as merchant shipping, private international law, civil aviation, international
arbitration, and customs cooperation. 79 Britain has also extended many bilateral
agreements to Hong Kong, including agreements relating to air services, extradi-
tion, visa abolition, investment protection, and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial suits.8s As China does not agree in principle with many of these
treaties, extensive negotiation is required."'
The unresolved state of Hong Kong law as 1997 approaches is bound to have
an effect on people's conduct. For example, one unanswered question is whether
publishers and software companies who depend on copyright protection for their
commercial success will wait until June 30, 1997, before deciding to relocate
to a jurisdiction where copyright protection is assured or make plans to relocate
now. 82 Hong Kong is a party to the Universal Copyright Convention and to the
Berne Convention, both of which provide reciprocal protection of copyrights in
works created by nationals of member countries.83 Copyright law is primarily
based on the United Kingdom Copyright Act of 1956. 4 Currently, designs and
patents registered in the United Kingdom receive protection in Hong Kong.85
Trademarks and service marks are registered in the Trade Mark Registry of Hong
Kong.8
6
The most optimistic attitude is to assume that if the localization and adaptation
of Hong Kong law is not complete by June 30, 1997, China will extend the
time to prepare amending legislation.8 7 However, China does have the power to
76. Michael Sze Cho-cheung, Hong Kong's Secretary for Constitutional Affairs, reported in
October 1993 that 110 of these U.K.-based ordinances have been dealt with by the Joint Liaison
Group, but this report must be qualified by noting that eighty of those laws did not need to be localized
as they will be allowed to lapse in 1997. Loh, supra note 74, at 15. Therefore, since the Basic Law
was enacted in 1990, only thirty of the 300 laws have been resolved. Id.
77. Peter Goodespeed, Tug-of-War over Hong Kong Enters End Game, TORONTO STAR,
Nov. 9, 1993, at A17.





83. Ferheen Mahomed, A Foreign Investor's Guide to the Environmental Legal Regime of Hong




87. Loh, supra note 74, at 15.
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invalidate all laws not amended to conform with the Basic Law. 8 Article 8 of
the Basic Law states that only Hong Kong laws that do not contravene the Basic
Law will remain in effect after 1997.89 Furthermore, article 17 states that the
NPC Standing Committee may invalidate any post-1997 Hong Kong legislation
that it determines is in violation of the Basic Law. 
9
Additional contradictions exist between the Basic Law and the Chinese Consti-
tution. 9' Article 8 of the Basic Law states that laws currently in force in Hong Kong
will remain basically unchanged.92 Yet under article 5 of the Chinese Constitution,
"[n]o law or administrative or local rules and regulations shall contravene the
constitution" and "[n]o organization or individual may enjoy the privilege of
being above the constitution. . . .',93The Preamble to the Constitution of the
People's Republic of China states that the Constitution is the fundamental law
of the state and has supreme legal authority; the people of all nationalities, all
state organs, the armed forces, all political parties, public organizations, and all
enterprises in the country must take the Constitution as the basic norm of conduct;
and they have the duty to uphold the dignity of the Constitution and ensure its
implementation. 94 As the common law in Hong Kong serves the interests of
capitalists, it seems impossible that the common law could not contradict the
socialist principles enshrined in the Chinese Constitution. 95
Yet, even China's Constitution may change at the whim of the Communist
Party. 96 In China, the Constitution does not represent a set of "immutable princi-
ples, but is a program of social reform to be interpreted according to the current
policies of the Communist party. 97 The Chinese Constitution has undergone
many revisions since 1954, illustrating the ease with which basic legal norms
88. Id.
89. Basic Law, supra note 71, at 1521. Article 8 in its entirety provides that "[t]he laws previously
in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation
and customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to any
amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." Id.
90. Id. at 1522.
91. One alternative to reduce the conflict that exists between the Basic Law, which is supposed
to give legal effect to the Joint Declaration, and the Chinese Constitution is to append the Basic Law
to the Constitution. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 700-01. The leaders of China have so far refused to
append the Basic Law to the Chinese Constitution. Observers suggest that Chinese leaders want to
"save face." Id. at 701. If China's government agrees that the Basic Law conflicts with the Chinese
Constitution, then they would also have to concede that the Joint Declaration conflicts as well. Id.
"The Chinese would be embarrassed to admit that they consciously entered into an agreement that
conflicted with the Constitution." Id.
92. Basic Law, supra note 71, at 1521.
93. P.R.C. CONST., supra note 24, art. V.
94. Id. preamble; see also Palumbo, supra note 2, at 701.
95. Matthew H. Hurlock, Social Harmony and Individual Rights in China, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1318, 1336 (1993) (reviewing BERRY FONO-CHUNG Hsu, THE COMMON LAW SYSTEM IN CHINESE
CONTEXT: HONG KONG IN TRANSITION (1992)).
96. See Neoh, supra note 1, at 333.
97. Keller, supra note 2, at 393.
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can be changed in China. 98 Ultimately, political ideology controls China's legal
system. 99
Chinese communist ideology adheres to four basic principles: keeping to the
socialist road; upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat; insisting on Commu-
nist Party leadership; and adhering to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought.'00
The leader of China's Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping, stated:
"One country, two systems" must be discussed on two levels. On one level is the
fact that within a socialist country we will be permitting a specially privileged area to
be capitalist not just for a short period of time, but for decades or a full century. On
another level, we must affirm that the principal system throughout the country is socialist.
• . . That we uphold the socialist system and the "four cardinal principles" was deter-
mined long ago, and is inscribed in our Constitution. The policies we formulate, includ-
ing our policies toward Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, are also determined on the
basis of upholding the four cardinal principles.'01
When constitutional freedoms conflict with one of these principles, such free-
doms may give way, as they did in the Tiananmen Square conflict in 1989.102
The specter of Tiananmen Square is often in people's minds when considering
the reversion of sovereignty to China. When Deng Xiaoping addressed the Basic
Law Drafting Committee in April 1987, he made his position clear that if the
"basic interests of his Central Government were to be threatened, then the Central
Government would act to protect itself."'0' Article 18 of the Basic Law grants
the Chinese government the power to issue an order applying the relevant national
laws in the region in the event of a state of war or if, by reason of turmoil, a
state of emergency exists.04
98. The first Constitution of the People's Republic of China was enacted on September 20, 1954;
the second on January 17, 1975; the third on March 17, 1978; the fourth on December 4, 1982;
the fifth and most recent change was made in 1988. Neoh, supra note 1, at 333 n. I11.
99. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 677-78.
100. Neoh, supra note 1, at 335.
101. Id. at 335-36.
102. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 678. Chinese students began to occupy Beijing's Tiananmen Square
in April 1989, demonstrating against the treatment of former party leader Hu Yaobang and making
speeches advocating democratic reform in China. Lawrence M. Friedman, "The United States-China
Act of 1991" and Customary International Law, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 257 n. 1 (1993) (citing
Jeffrey A. McCredie, Human Rights in the People's Republic of China: An Appraisal of Recent
Events, 3 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 217, 217-18 (1989)). The Chinese government imposed martial
law and soon after began arresting and beating the students. Id. Ultimately, over 300,000 troops
with tanks were necessary for the government to regain control in Beijing. Id. Estimates of casualties
ranged from 500 to 1,000, though the Chinese government maintains that no deaths occurred in
Tiananmen Square. Id. The Tiananmen Square incident and the imposition of martial law has brought
into question the actual validity and authority of the 1982 Chinese Constitution. Palumbo, supra
note 2, at 678. The Chinese government's actions have been widely criticized as being in violation
of China's Constitution. Article 29 provides that the military may only be used "in the event of the
invasion by a foreign enemy, or a serious armed riot within the country." Id.
103. Neoh, supra note 1, at 336.
104. Basic Law, supra note 71, at 1523.
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C. INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
CHINA AND BRITAIN
The Joint Declaration provides that disputes over interpretation and implemen-
tation are to be resolved at the level of the Joint Liaison Group, and failing that,
by consultations between the British and Chinese governments. 05 No provisions
concerning penalties for violations of the agreement were included in the Joint
Declaration.' °6 Britain will have little control over interpretation of the Joint
Declaration after the transfer of sovereignty in 1997. 107 As the Joint Declaration
provides no institutional mechanism for the resolution of disagreements over
interpretation or implementation, the British government is restricted to the tradi-
tional rights of any sovereign party to an international treaty.l0 8 These traditional
rights consist of the issuance of protests, demand for negotiations, and possible
retaliatory measures in the event of breach.3 9 The Joint Declaration contains no
explicit statement that it takes priority over the Basic Law; therefore, the treaty
cannot be invoked in any legal proceeding as binding authority for the interpreta-
tion of the Basic Law." 10
As stated previously in the discussion of the Joint Declaration, China weakened
Britain's bargaining power in negotiating the agreement for the transfer of sover-
eignty by insisting that if an agreement were not reached, China would unilaterally
determine Hong Kong's fate. "' Many issues are not well-defined and some areas
are not specifically addressed. For instance, the agreements between China and
Britain do not say anything specific about British instigated changes in Hong
Kong before the 1997 transfer of sovereignty." 2 The Joint Declaration does
state that "the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the
administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving its
economic prosperity and social stability; and that the Government of the People's
Republic of China will give its cooperation in this connection.""13 However,
when the current governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, put forth a proposal at
the end of 1992 to broaden Hong Kong's electoral base and give residents more
105. Neoh, supra note 1, at 327.
106. Palumbo, supra note 1, at 695.
107. See Keller, supra note 2, at 388.
108. Id.
109. Id. If China violates the Joint Declaration, Britain could bring an action against China in
the International Court of Justice; however, such action is unlikely as there is doubt that China would
accept the Court's jurisdiction over the matter. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 695.
110. Keller, supra note 2, at 392.
111. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 673.
112. Lena H. Sun, Governor of Hong Kong Takes on China's Leaders, Moves Toward Democracy
in Enclave Irk Beijing, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1992, at A16.
113. White Paper, supra note 4, at 1372.
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of a say in choosing legislators, China reacted strongly.' 14 China issued statements
threatening to scrap the Basic Law and announced that it would not honor any
contracts after 1997.115
One Hong Kong government official commented, "[t]he language used was
extraordinary," noting that the vitriol directed at Patten had not been used since
the Cultural Revolution. 116 The Chinese government accused Britain of breaking
prior agreements and of undermining a smooth transfer of power. 1 7 It warned
that if Britain went back on its word, then so could China, and the whole future
of "one country, two systems" could be in jeopardy." 8
In June 1994 Hong Kong's legislature narrowly passed Governor Patten's
democratic reform bill." 9 For the first time in Hong Kong's history, its citizens
will be able to choose the majority of their legislators in the 1995 elections. 20
China, however, fulfilled its threats by announcing in September 1994 that it
would disband Hong Kong's legislature and other elected institutions when Hong
Kong reverts to Chinese rule in 1997.21' China's Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress voted to disband Hong Kong's legislature and district
and city councils and to replace them with a new legislature based on the Basic
Law and decisions by the National People's Congress.122
Sources for legal analysis in Hong Kong after 1997 are not clear.' 23 Currently,
a Hong Kong judge with a question of interpretation looks to the Hong Kong
constitutional devices and British case law. 12 4 The Joint Declaration is vague on
114. Patten proposed lowering the voting age from 21 to 18, allowing direct election for municipal
councils, expanding the franchise for 30 out of 60 Legislative Council seats, and allowing voters
to choose an electoral committee that would in turn vote for 10 legislators. Sun, supra note 111, at
A16; see also David Holley & Christine Courtney, Britain and China to Discuss Rules for Hong
Kong Election, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1993, at A4.
115. Matt Miller, China Pours Cash into Hong Kong-Down Payment on Future of City It Takes
Over in '97, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 25, 1993, at Al.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. H.D.S. Greenway, Borrowed Time-Despite China's Promise to Leave Hong Kong's Capital-
ist System Alone for 50 Years, Unease and Doubt Plague This Prosperous British Colony as It Counts
Down to 1997, BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 1993, Sunday Magazine, at 14.
119. Jesse Wong, Hong Kong Approves Political Reform, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 30, 1994,
at 1.
120. China to Disband the Legislature in Hong Kong, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at 5.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Melissa K. Bauman, Note, Defamation in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China:
Potential Perils of Two Standards of Free Speech, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 671, 676
(1992).
124. Id. The laws of Hong Kong currently consist of: (1) statutes made by the Hong Kong Governor
with the consent of the legislature, (2) the common law of Britain and rules of equity except where
they are determined to be oppressive, (3) acts of the British Parliament specifically incorporated by
reference in local legislation, (4) acts of Parliament that expressly or by necessary implication apply
to Hong Kong, and (5) Orders-in-Council made by the Queen on the advice of her Privy Council.
Neoh, supra note 1, at 339.
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this issue. 125 As the Basic Law is the principal document governing Hong Kong's
relationship with China, its interpretation will certainly play a key role in legal
analysis. The Basic Law is not a common law statute; it is a purely Chinese
statute and can be understood only in that context. 
26
China's contemporary legal system remains heavily influenced by Soviet legal
doctrines of the Stalin era. 27 According to these doctrines, law is the legislative
expression of the will of the ruling class. 128 Chinese law also reflects the country's
history of Confucian philosophy and centralized imperial government. 129 "Law
has traditionally been the punitive face of authority-a disciplining force to be
exerted against wrongdoers in order to restore social stability and public order
when the power of custom and morality has failed.
' 130
An important part of Hong Kong's legal system derives from international
treaties. '3' Presently, treaties are made applicable to Hong Kong by their terms
or by British legislation. 32 With the transfer of sovereignty to China, the applica-
tion of these treaties to Hong Kong will lapse.133 The Basic Law provides that
China will decide whether international agreements to which China is a party
will apply to Hong Kong. '34
125. Bauman, supra note 130, at 676.




130. Id. As part of China's economic reform there have been some changes in Chinese law. See
generally Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded Factors
in the Transformation from Hierarchy to Market, 1978-1989, 5 J. CInNESE L. 143 (1991). Most
notably, China has recognized contract law. Id. "The emphasis on contractual responsibility was
created by the Chinese leadership to enhance the opportunities and incentives for economic enter-
prise." Id. at 146. China realized the difficulties in attracting foreign partners to provide the currency
and technology that they need without a contractual framework in place. Id. at 146-47. China also
used contract domestically to increase productivity in some sectors. Id. at 146. Managers in some
state-owned factories signed agreements to meet set production quotas. Id. In return, the managers
received incentives for increased production and efficiency and the authority to sell production in
excess of the quotas. Id. These uses of contract were accompanied by a growing legal infrastructure:
the beginnings of a civil code that would recognize contractual obligations; new civil courts; and
the recruitment and training of lawyers, legal advisors, and notaries. Id. at 147. Nonetheless, these
institutions remain weak. Id. Chinese courts are subservient to the local government and the Commu-
nist Party; the civil codes are incomplete and confusing, and the proportion of trained legal personnel
remains low. Id.
131. Neoh, supra note 1, at 350. Hong Kong is currently a party to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, extradition treaties, and multilateral conventions on judicial matters. Walden
Country Reports, Hong Kong, Walden Publishing Ltd., 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD file.
132. Neoh, supra note 1, at 350.
133. Id.
134. Basic Law, supra note 71, at 1544; see also Keller, supra note 2, at 392.
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D. DOCTRINAL PURITY VERSUS ECONOMIC GAINS
Even if China is willing to honor the Joint Declaration, the question remains
whether they will be able to honor its terms. 135 The Joint Declaration was negoti-
ated when moderate political forces were in power. 136 The moderates were thought
to be looking forward to enjoying some improvement in China's economy as the
result of having Hong Kong as one of its Special Administrative Regions. 137 In
the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, with the political conservatives in power,
public order and security are of paramount concern.13
8
Another unresolved issue is the conundrum of how China's socialist constitution
can be the supreme law and yet permit the continued existence of capitalism. '
39
In the mid-1980s some Chinese scholars suggested an amendment to the Chinese
Constitution that would officially recognize the capitalist enclaves established as
Special Administrative Regions.'40 In the alternative, China could have addressed
the issue when enacting the Basic Law by stating that only article 31 of the
Chinese Constitution (the article providing for Special Administrative Regions)
would apply. 14 However, according to recent legal texts and articles from China,
the Chinese Constitution remains the supreme law of the country and the legal
expression of national sovereignty, and therefore must apply in full to Hong
Kong.142 The contradiction of Hong Kong's status as a Special Administrative
Region allowed to maintain a capitalist system, yet governed by a communist
constitution, leaves Hong Kong's legal relationship to the rest of China vague
and confusing.
China experts warn that if a conflict arises between political control and eco-
nomic progress, political control will win. 143 According to these commentators,
135. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 691.
136. Id. at 693.
137. Id.
138. Because the hard-line Communist Party leaders value public order so highly, some in Hong
Kong fear that if these leaders remain a controlling force in China, public order in Hong Kong will
be a higher priority than economic prosperity. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 694. On the other hand,
there is some indication that Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, who
is considered a moderate, may gain control of China's government when Deng Xiaoping resigns or
dies. Id. If Jiang Zemin or some other moderate gains control, then Hong Kong's future as a capitalist
region will be more secure. Id.




143. Greenway, supra note 118, at 14. "By all indications, the current leaders of China, while
fearing political and economic chaos, still want economic reform, but in a more limited and controlled
way. " Cheng & Rosett, supra note 127, at 149. Chinese leaders want the economic benefits while
avoiding the dispersion of power that reform implies; they seem to believe that economic reform
can be achieved without any fundamental political change. Id. "As long as China's leaders are
determined to adhere to Marxist ideology, build up 'socialism with distinct Chinese characteristics,'
and maintain 'the planned economy combined with market forces,' any setback in economic perfor-
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the policy of "one country, two systems" does not imply parity between capital-
ism and communism, but rather the unification of the country as a socialist state
in which capitalist Special Administrative Regions will be permitted to exist for
a transitional period.'44 In Hong Kong's case, that transitional period is defined
as fifty years. 145 Chinese governmental authorities have rejected any suggestion




Hong Kong is the second largest financial center in the Pacific region. Of its
165 banks, seventy-six are among the top 100 banks in the world. 47 The tiny
British colony has amassed the greatest concentration of wealth in Asia.148
The flow of capital from China to Hong Kong has increased dramatically in
the last few years. 49 Through trading, finance, and the reexport of Chinese goods,
Hong Kong has been China's golden goose. 50 China gets a substantial portion of
its foreign exchange from Hong Kong.' 5' Property analysts estimate that Chinese
companies have plowed over $20 billion into Hong Kong real estate in the past
two years alone. 152 Hong Kong harbor is filled with Chinese vessels.'53 In 1992
trade with China totaled $54 billion, 35 percent of Hong Kong's total trade. 54
Almost every Chinese province either openly or indirectly conducts business
in Hong Kong. 55 Many Chinese governmental units have secret hard currency
accounts in Hong Kong banks.'56 Many of China's key ruling families have sons
and daughters working in lucrative jobs in Hong Kong.5 7
mance could easily force China's leaders to reverse their reform movement." Jong H. Park, Impact
of China's Open-Door Policy on Pacific Rim Trade and Investment, Bus. ECON., Oct. 1993, at 51,
54.
144. Keller, supra note 2, at 390.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. David Stamp, HK to Lose Financial Status under China, REUTER ASIA-PAC. Bus. REP.,
June 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, REUAPB file.
148. Citibank estimates that $1 trillion in investible capital is available in Hong Kong. This figure
includes government and corporate reserves, investment property, savings, and consumers' stock
holdings. Pete Engardio et al., Asia's Wealth: It's Creating a Massive Shift in Global Economic
Power (Special Report), Bus. WK., Nov. 29, 1993, at 104, col. 2.
149. Miller, supra note 115, at Al.
150. Id.
151. Sun, supra note 112, at A16.
152. Miller, supra note 115, at Al.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also Neoh, supra note 1, at 320.
155. Sun, supra note 112, at A16.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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The impact of China's increased stake in Hong Kong is under close scrutiny.
Some Hong Kong residents and business people view Chinese investment as a
positive sign.' 58 They see it as further indication that the fortunes of China and
Hong Kong are interwoven and that China wants Hong Kong to prosper after
1997.159 Others view the situation as the downside of market reforms in mainland
China.'60 Many Chinese investments appear designed for short-term profits, not
long-term stability. 16'
China is already intervening in Hong Kong's economy by stalling major eco-
nomic projects. 16' Beijing is using these projects as pawns to express disapproval
of Governor Patten's efforts to expand democracy before Britain hands over
power to China. 163 Discussions between Britain and China regarding building a
much-needed container shipping terminal for Hong Kong have reached a stale-
mate.)" China also blocked financing for a new Hong Kong airport for years,
saying it feared the project would leave Hong Kong with a mountain of debt after
1997. 165 On November 5, 1994, China and Britain finally signed an agreement to
pay for the new $20 billion airport.'66 However, officials say the agreement leaves
major details still unresolved. 167
Business leaders must make decisions now on whether to invest billions of
dollars that may earn returns only after the 1997 transition. 168 Hong Kong's stock
market indicates that many business executives are making the decision to invest.
Hong Kong's Hang Seng index rose 20 percent during October and November
1993.169 The remarkable rise is partially attributable to a visit to China by a group
of U.S. fund managers organized by the U.S. securities firm of Morgan Stanley.'7 0
The firm's chief equities strategist, Barton Biggs, predicts that investing in China
will be "the world's most profitable investment opportunity for the next 10
years.' ' 7 ' He further stated that "[t]he best way into the China restructuring
story is through Hong Kong.'
172
Hong Kong's large, liquid market appeals to large U.S. investment institu-




162. Stamp, supra note 147.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.; see also Goodespeed, supra note 77, at A17.
166. China and Britain Agree on Hong Kong Airport, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1994, at 5.
167. Id.
168. Paul Blustein, A Vote of Confidence in Hong Kong: Business Investing Heavily as 1997
Optimism Rises, WASH. POST, May 25, 1992, at Al.
169. Simon Holberton & Patrick Harverson, Foothold on Cliff of Opportunity: Foreign Investors
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tions. 173 Currently, the Hong Kong government makes no distinction between
local and foreign companies.'74 No restrictions are placed on capital movements
or repatriation of profits. 75 "Hong Kong's wide-open financial markets are the
extreme opposite of those in Singapore or Taiwan, and that has made it a thriving
center of Chinese capitalism." 1 76 In 1990 Hong Kong authorities began discus-
sions with China on plans to negotiate investor-protection agreements with major
overseas partners, such as the United States, Japan, and several European coun-
tries. 177 The goal of these agreements is to provide guarantees for foreign-owned
businesses after 1997.178
Hong Kong also attracts foreign investors because its stock market has more
listed companies involved in China than any other stock market in the world. 179
In the latest investment surge, investors have been targeting Hong Kong compa-
nies with a strong exposure to the Chinese economy.18 0 Hong Kong-based invest-
ors have signed letters of intent for more than $100 billion in mainland China
projects in the past three years."'8
The speed with which Hong Kong stock prices have risen has unsettled some
investors and observers. They think that the Hong Kong market is overvalued
and vulnerable to a political or economic setback. 2 One international investment
strategist says that U.S. investors may have mistaken Morgan Stanley's forecast
of a positive economic outlook in China for a forecast of a positive, short-term
outlook for the Hong Kong market. 8 3 "There is a good deal of indiscriminate
buying taking place based on the long-term Chinese economic story ...but
there is a distinction between what is a good economic story and what is a good
market story. ,'u
Hong Kong is undeniably the best gateway to China, but its stock market is
vulnerable to internal Chinese politics. 8 5 Hong Kong's stock market has been
a roller coaster, rising and falling in relationship to the progress of negotiations
between Britain and China regarding the transfer of power in 1997.16 At one
point in November 1993 the Hang Seng index climbed to a record high of 9,612
173. Id.
174. Walden Country Reports, Hong Kong, supra note 131.
175. Id.
176. Engardio, supra note 148, at 104, col. 2.
177. Walden Country Reports, Hong Kong, supra note 131.
178. Id.
179. Holberton & Harverson, supra note 169, at 17.
180. U.S. investors are not the only ones investing in Hong Kong. Nomura Securities, the leading
Japanese stockbroker, recently raised one billion dollars for investment in Asian equities. Id. If this
trend continues, Japan may, for the first time, commit large sums to Hong Kong equities. Id.
181. Engardio, supra note 148, at 104, col. 3.




186. Goodespeed, supra note 77, at A17.
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points, but in the next three days plunged more than 646 points and lost 6.7
percent of its value.18 7 Since 1984 the Hong Kong market has suffered what is
known as a "political discount."' 8 8 Political discount is shown by comparing
the difference between Hong Kong's rating relative to other Asian markets.1
8 9
Investors are currently prepared to pay prices of 19 to 24 times future corporate
earnings in markets such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, but in Hong
Kong they are prepared to pay only about 14 times future earnings.190 Even though
Hong Kong's prices are lower than other markets' in Asia, the current price is
above Hong Kong's historical trend, "suggesting that either the market is in the
process of being re-rated upwards to south-east Asian levels, or that a savage
correction downwards could be in the offing."' 9'
While China has given reassurances that Hong Kong will maintain its capitalis-
tic system and that the Chinese government will not expropriate foreign property,
it has also shown that if its sovereign authority is threatened, retaliation may be
severe.' 92 In response to Governor Patten's proposals for democratic reform,
China warned that it could abrogate any long-term contracts after Hong Kong
reverts to China in 1997.193 In a statement distributed by the New China News
Agency, the Chinese government said," [c]ontracts, leases and agreements signed
and ratified by the Hong Kong British government which are not approved by
the Chinese side will be invalid after June 30, 1997. "''94
China itself has recently announced several economic reforms. China's banking
system is undergoing an overhaul that will enable banks to lend based on commer-
cial rather than political criteria.' 95 Currently, China's banks, which are estimated
to have $2.3 trillion in deposits, have loan policies dictated by the government
that force them to redirect savings into unprofitable state industries. 196 China has
taken steps to unify its currency. 197 A U.S. Treasury official stated that China's
move to a single, floating currency "constitutes a major step toward changing
an exchange rate regime that has functioned as a big trade barrier." 198 Addition-
ally, the Chinese stock exchange, where market capitalization has grown from
187. Id.




192. See Sun, supra note 112, at A16 (in the 1960s Hong Kong critics of mainland China were
the targets of fire-bombing; in 1989 the Tiananmen Square conflict also resulted in the death of
pro-democracy demonstrators).
193. Reuters, China Threatens to Cancel Contracts in Hong Kong After 1997 Turnover, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1992, at A4.
194. Id.
195. Engardio, supra note 148, at 103, col. 3.
196. Id. col. 2.
197. China: Bentsen Says China Needs More Progress on Human Rights Before MFN Is Renewed,
11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 51 (Jan. 12, 1994).
198. Id.
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zero to $32 billion in two years, is taking steps toward a Western-style regulatory
system and increasing its listings. '99 China is also introducing a secondary bond
market and mutual funds.2° In the past, with few legal financial instruments to
put cash into, local governments and state companies have put profits in real
estate or siphoned it offshore into "shadowy Hong Kong companies.-
20 1
In spite of China's economic reforms, there is still concern that government
corruption and mismanagement may prevent China's wealth from being distrib-
uted to areas that need capital. 2 2 "Many Communist Party officials prefer to
enrich themselves in secret by dealing with the overseas Chinese networks."
20 3
Government reformers want the wealth to be in the hands of modern capital
markets.204 Trillions of dollars are needed to build highways, telecommunications
systems, and power plants.2 °5 Huge amounts of money will need to be invested
to build capital-intensive industries such as microelectronics, steel, and petro-
chemicals. 206 These needs must be met if China is to advance from cheap-labor
sweatshops to an advanced industrialized status.2 °7 Yet, one business publication
noted that "[w]hile 'red capitalists' in South China cruise in Lexuses and impress
each other by smashing $200 bottles of cognac at the banquet table, millions of
peasants still live in poverty.'
20 8
Many residents of Hong Kong are establishing residence in other countries.
This brain drain is bound to affect all of Hong Kong's business community.2 9
Some Hong Kong business leaders have tried to refute the brain drain by pointing
out that many businessmen have really never left Hong Kong and that many who
did are coming back looking for positions.21 0 This practice is so prevalent that
a term has been coined-astronauts. 21 These "astronauts" are professional men
who live in Hong Kong while their families live in other countries to establish
residency.212 They want to guarantee that their children have better lifestyles and
199. Engardio, supra note 148, at 103, col. 2.
200. Id. col. 3.
201. Id. col. 2.
202. Id. col. 1.
203. Id. at 108, col. 1.
204. Id. col. 2.
205. Id. at 102, col. 2.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 103, col. 1.
209. Neoh, supra note 1, at 324; Palumbo, supra note 2, at 705 (immigration began after the
signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984 and increased in 1989 following the Tiananmen Square
conflict in Beijing; the primary destination has been Canada, but England, Australia, and the United
States also receive many applications).
210. Daniela Deane, Have Job, Will Travel, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1993, at E8; see also Pete
McMartin, Going Home: Boom Economy of Hong Kong Lures Some Back, VANCOUVER SUN,
Nov. 5, 1993, at B1.
211. Deane, supra note 210, at B10.
212. Id.
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educational opportunities than Hong Kong may be able to provide.2' 3 However,
if these children are residents of another country, if they are raised and educated
in another country, they probably will not return to Hong Kong. The effect of
this loss will only be delayed.214
B. TRADE
Although China is itself trying to regain membership in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), it has allowed Hong Kong to become a member.21 5
The People's Republic of China supplied the GATT with confirmation that Hong
Kong will continue to possess full autonomy in its external commercial relations
after 1997.216 The confirmation of autonomy was an important commitment in
view of the interests of the GATT contracting parties in ensuring that Hong Kong
will not be subsumed into China's nonmarket system.217
The declaration of Hong Kong's autonomy is characterized as going beyond
a political pledge to constitute an undertaking of legal obligation.21 8 Any interfer-
ence with the autonomy of Hong Kong after 1997 would presumably be actionable
within the framework of the GATT.2 9 Both Britain and China will have to work
in cooperation to ensure the continued application of existing international
agreements applicable to Hong Kong and Hong Kong's continued participation
in international organizations.22°
213. Id.
214. Id. Although much as been written about Hong Kong's brain drain, recent reports have noted
a new trend-reverse immigration. McMartin, supra note 210, at BI. Many of the residents who
left Hong Kong may be returning. Id. These are not the so-called astronauts who shuttle back and
forth between another country and Hong Kong, but immigrants who are leaving countries such as
Canada, Australia, and the United States and resettling in Hong Kong. Id. According to the Hong
Kong Trade Development Council, the Hong Kong censug and statistics department recorded a net
inflow of 65,000 returnees between mid-1992 and mid-1993. Id. Most of the people returning to
Hong Kong had moved to Canada and established citizenship, but because of difficulties in finding
a job with a salary comparable to Hong Kong's pay scale these people are moving back to Hong
Kong. Id. As Hong Kong and Canada both recognize dual citizenship, the people returning have
the best of both worlds: access to Hong Kong's dynamic economy and the insurance of Canadian
citizenship if the political atmosphere in Hong Kong becomes unstable. Id.
215. China: China Said to Scale Down Expectation of Early Accession to GATT, Sources Say,
10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1371 (Aug. 10, 1993). China was a founding member of the GATT in
1948, but left after the Communist takeover in 1949. Id. The People's Republic of China is now
seeking to resume the seat vacated in 1949. Id. The contracting parties to the GATT did permit
China to participate in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Lori Fisler Damrosch, GA7TMembership
in a Changing World Order: Taiwan, China, and the Former Soviet Republics, 1992 COLUM. Bus.
L. REv. 19, 23 n.9 (1992).
216. Damrosch, supra note 215, at 25.
217. Id. at 35.
218. Id.
219. Id. Remedies would be comparable to those applied in the case of any breach of undertakings
under the GATT, with the unusual twist that in the event China is still a nonmember at the time of
the dispute, the issue would arise as to whether retaliatory measures would apply to Hong Kong
only, or whether sanctions could be directed against China as a whole. Id.
220. Neoh, supra note 1, at 351.
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Even if China becomes a contracting party to the GATT, uncertainties exist
as to how China will accept Hong Kong's autonomous status. For instance, earlier
this year, Hong Kong authorities broke up an international counterfeiting ring
that conspired to export thousands of pirated video games to Latin America.22'
The games were made in China and sent to Hong Kong for shipment. Currently,
many petitions are filed in the United States against China for intellectual property,
transshipment, and trade quota violations.222 The Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative estimates that Chinese products shipped through third countries and
relabeled to avoid quota restrictions accounted for $2 billion of China's $6 billion
in textile exports to the United States.223 In response to this problem, on January
6, 1994, the U.S. Trade Representative announced that some of China's textile
quotas may be cut by as much as one-third.224 China has responded that if these
quota cuts take effect they will take corresponding retaliatory measures. 225
As 1997 approaches, can GATT contracting parties still expect enforcement
assistance from Hong Kong? Or will pressure from China cause Hong Kong
customs authorities to close their eyes to violations of international agreements
where China is the culprit?
C. HUMAN RIGHTS
Inextricably tied into the business climate is the human rights issue. Levi
Strauss recently announced that it is closing its plants in China. This transnational
corporation cited China's lack of regard for human rights as its reason for pulling
out of China.226 A spokesperson for Levi Strauss told the Bureau of National
Affairs that global souring guidelines require that the company consider human
rights issues when making decisions regarding international purchasing and con-
tracting .2 27 The American clothing manufacturer's decision came after conducting
a six-month study of China's human rights situation.228 The company stated that
"to continue manufacturing in China was unethical, given the scale of abuses." 229
Levi Strauss is the second American company known to withdraw from China
221. Also in the News-General Developments, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1344 (Aug. 11, 1993).
222. See Textiles: USTR Raises Textile Transshipment in Talks with China, Hong Kong and
Macau, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1495 (Sept. 15, 1993).
223. China: Chinese Textile Quotas to Be Cut; China Says It Will Retaliate in Turn, 11 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 48 (Jan. 12, 1994).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Company & Industry, China, CROSSBORDER MONITOR (formerly Bus. INT'L), June 16, 1993,
at 5; see also USTR Kantor Welcomes Levi Strauss Decision to Leave China over Human Rights
Concerns, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 780 (May 12, 1993) [hereinafter USTR Kantor].
227. USTR Kantor, supra note 226.
228. Company & Industry, China, supra note 226, at 5.
229. Id.
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on the basis of its human rights record.2 30 Timberland Company, an apparel and
shoe manufacturer, decided to stop doing business with China in 1989 after the
government's crackdown on the student democracy movement at Tiananmen
Square. 23' Other companies, such as Roebuck International and Sears, Roebuck
and Company, have adopted human rights policies that are binding on their
Chinese contractors.232
In May 1994 the United States granted China most-favored-nation (MFN)
status and severed the link between trade and human rights.233 When announcing
the MFN decision, U.S. President Bill Clinton said the issue of human rights
could be better advanced if the United States engaged China commercially. 2 4
President Clinton vowed to develop a voluntary code of business principles for
American companies operating within China's borders to promote human
rights.235
In recent meetings with the Clinton administration U.S. business representa-
tives have shown little interest in a rigorous code that could prod China to improve
human rights.236 On the other hand, labor and human rights groups are pressing
for standards that are tougher than American companies would ever accept.
237
"As a result, the administration is increasingly unlikely to produce the kind of
credible code that would be part of the 'new and vigorous' human-rights program
Mr. Clinton promised when he renewed China's so-called most-favored-nation
status.' ,238
Indeed, human rights abuses appear to continue unabated in China. 239 Human
230. Donna K. H. Walters, Firms Unshaken by U.S. Terms for China; Trade: Country's Most
Favored Nation Status Is Now Linked to Human Rights, but Companies Say Their Role Is Not That
of Lobbyist, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1993, at D3.
231. Id.
232. Frank Gibney, Jr., The Trouble with China, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1993, at 46.
233. Robert S. Greenberger, Rights Rules: Clinton Seems Unlikely to Form Code for China,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1994, at 1. Historically, trade has played the most significant role
in U.S.-China relations. John Kruger & Charles Lewis, Bill's Long March: When Big Money
Talked, Clinton Retreated to George Bush's Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1993, at C3. Attempts
by the United States to exert influence over Chinese policy have not resulted in great success.
Id. In 1821 a sailor aboard an American trading ship was implicated in the drowning of a Chinese
woman. Id. China threatened to revoke trade status with the United States unless the man was
turned over to Chinese authorities. The United States was forced to give in, saying "[w]e are
bound to submit to your laws while we are in your waters; be they ever so unjust, we will not
resist them." Id. The sailor was hanged. Id. In the 1860s, an effort to engage China through
trade led the United States trade emissary to promise that the United States "will not ask for,
nor take concessions of, territory in the treaty ports, or in any way interfere with the jurisdiction
of the Chinese government over its own people .. " Id.
234. Helene Cooper & Kathy Chen, China to Renew Talks with U.S. on Rights Issue, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1994, at 1.




239. Kruger & Lewis, supra note 233, at C3.
SPRING 1995
198 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Rights Watch/Asia (Asia Watch) said that shortly after the United States renewed
China's MFN status, China criminalized many forms of civil protest.24 The new
laws include a ban on cooperation with nongovernment organizations outside
China and make illegal the receipt of assistance from any group that Beijing
deems a "hostile organization.-1 4' According to Asia Watch, more than forty
political leaders were imprisoned by the Chinese government in 1992 and 1993.242
Asia Watch reports that one political prisoner was sent to a psychiatric institute last
year after unfurling a banner to commemorate the third anniversary of Tiananmen
Square. Since then the political leader has been forced to take psychotropic drugs
as treatment for "paranoid psychosis."
243
In connection with the 1993 renewal of China's MFN status, the United States
and China signed a memorandum of understanding in August 1992.24 The
agreement prohibits exports to the United States of goods made by prison labor. 45
Problems have arisen because China has resisted efforts to stop the use of prison
labor. Repeated requests for inspections of Chinese prison labor camps by the
United States have been ignored or refused by China. 246 The few requests that
were granted allowed only limited access to U.S.inspectors.247
Unfortunately, even Chinese workers who are not in the prison camps often
work under conditions that make them virtual prisoners. State-owned Capital
Steel in Beijing works employees 365 days a year; if an employee misses a day
due to illness, he or she is fined .248 "People are being worked way beyond
reasonable limits and then docked if they don't," says an engineer at a U.S.-
Chinese joint venture. 9 With China's economy growing at such a rapid rate,
and factories struggling under an avalanche of orders, conditions are likely to
worsen.
250
Many American companies and industries do not agree that China's trade status
should be conditioned on the human rights issue. These companies say that "they
promote democracy and human rights simply by being in China, trading with the
country and showing the Chinese firsthand how a free and capitalistic marketplace
works." 21 ' Even Roebuck International, which awards a prize for human rights
240. Greenberger, supra note 233, at 1.
241. Id.
242. Kruger & Lewis, supra note 233, at C3.
243. Id.
244. China Fails to Implement Pact with U.S. on Prison Labor Exports, Officials Say, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1490 (Sept. 15, 1993).
245. Id.
246. As of October 1993 China had responded to only 16 of 31 requests for investigations under
the pact and had granted one of five requests to inspect suspect facilities. Id.
247. Id.
248. Gibney, supra note 232, at 46.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Walters, supra note 230, at D3.
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accomplishments, "believes its best hope for change in China is by example." 252
Luggage-maker Samsonite also shares the view that the best way to change China's
policies on human rights is through example. Samsonite announced that it is
considering plans to open plants in China to manufacture products for East Asia.253
The president of Samsonite's international division said, "[i]solating China will
not help nor enhance human rights .... Opening its market is a more efficient
way to try and bring about change."
2
Other companies feel that they have little choice but to be in China. 255 With
more than 1.5 billion people, China has the potential to become the world's single
largest buyer of consumer and industrial products. American Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation (AT&T) recently signed a system support agreement,
valued at $500 million over five years, with governmental entities in China's
Guandong province.256 Since only two out of every ten people living in China
have telephones, the country is a huge opportunity for AT&T.257 Boeing Company
received orders totalling $9 billion for jetliners, and China's thirty-five airlines
are expected to be the aerospace industry's most frequent buyer in the next
decade.258 As Christopher Padill, manager of government affairs for AT&T
stated, "[t] here's not as much predictability and stability (in China) as businesses
might like. . . .On the other hand, AT&T has to be there.",
259
Standing up for human rights also has immediate costs to the United States
as a whole. Footwear import lobbyists say that inexpensive shoes from China
save the American consumer $16 billion annually. 260 The U.S. Department of
Commerce estimated in 1992 that 157,000 jobs depend on the Chinese export
market. 26' The money made on aircraft sales to China certainly helped the ailing
U.S. airline industry.262 In a time of slow economic recovery, these statistics
were probably a key factor in the decision to renew China's MFN status.
263
Britain and Hong Kong have made efforts to ensure that China's lack of regard
for human rights will not have a damaging effect on Hong Kong after the transfer
of power to China in 1997 .264 Annex I of the Joint Declaration states that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
252. Kruger & Lewis, supra note 233, at C3.
253. Jenny Lam, Samsonite May Set up China Plants to Serve Asian Markets, Bus. TIMES, May
11, 1993, at 14.
254. Id.
255. Walters, supra note 230, at D3.
256. James T. Areddy, AT&T Wins Guangdong Orders, Capping a Big Week for Brown, AsIAN
WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1994, at 4.
257. AT&T, Ford Back China Trade Status, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 1994, at lB.
258. Waiters, supra note 230, at D3.
259. Id.




264. See generally Keller, supra note 2, at 385-405.
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Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) will remain in
force in Hong Kong.265 In addition, Hong Kong recently enacted the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights that incorporates the ICCPR into the colony's legal system. 266 This
enactment represents an unprecedented legal development for Hong Kong; if
successful, primary responsibility for the protection of civil liberties will shift
away from government administration and toward the judiciary.267
Still unresolved is the issue of how the Hong Kong Bill of Rights will coexist
with China's Constitution. 268 The Chinese Constitution is not subject to judicial
or administrative interpretation, but is entrusted to the sole jurisdiction of the
National People's Congress Standing Committee.2 69 The Standing Committee has
not established any internal procedures to consider constitutional issues and has
reportedly not decided a single constitutional case since the establishment of the
People's Republic of China.27° Observers find it difficult to imagine that a Hong
Kong judgment against Chinese government legislation or administrative action
that violates the Bill of Rights will be well received in Beijing. 271
In any event, China can use provisions of the Basic Law to render the Bill of
Rights ineffective. Article 8 states that only Hong Kong laws that do not contra-
vene the Basic Law will remain in effect after 1997, and article 17 states that
the National People's Congress Standing Committee may invalidate any post-1997
Hong Kong legislation that it determines violates the Basic Law. 272
Another provision in the Basic Law that raises human rights concerns is article
18, which grants the Chinese government the power to "issue an order applying
the relevant national laws in the Region" if the region is in a state of war or if,
by reason of turmoil, a state of emergency exists.273 Much of the anxiety about
article 18 revolves around speculation as to how the Chinese government may
define the term turmoil. One concern is that Hong Kong depends almost exclu-
sively on China for water, meat, vegetables, and food grains.274 To paralyze the
region, China could simply shut off Hong Kong's water supply. 275
A recent public announcement from government officials in Beijing placed a
265. Id. at 386.
266. Id. at 398.
267. Id. at 373.
268. Id. at 393. It is important to note the distinction between a right and a freedom under Chinese
law. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 674. Freedom to engage in a certain activity means that a citizen
may engage in that freedom only if it does not conflict with another citizen's freedom and if it does
not conflict with a state interest. Id. A right takes precedence over a freedom. How this distinction
is manifested is not always clear, but it is noteworthy that Chinese citizens are guaranteed many
freedoms under China's Constitution. Id.
269. Keller, supra note 2, at 393.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 395.
272. Basic Law, supra note 71, at 1521-22.
273. Id. at 1523.
274. Palumbo, supra note 2, at 673.
275. Id.
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national ban on satellite dishes. 276 China's vice-minister of radio, film, and televi-
sion stated: "Our control over foreign-originated television programs is a question
of national sovereignty.. . .Such control is beneficial to the cultivation of patrio-
tism among our citizens, safeguards the superior tradition of the Chinese race,
promotes socialist civilization and maintains social stability." 277 The announce-
ment concerned Hong Kong residents, serving as a clear illustration of China's
goal of social and political control. 27 ' The ban brought into sharp focus the differ-
ence between Hong Kong's "freewheeling notions of press and public freedoms"
and China's "callous caution." 279 Fears are growing that China may already be
stifling press freedom in Hong Kong through a "combination of heavyhanded
police arrests, economic blackmail, outright bans and subtle intimidation.-
2 0
In 1993 an editor with China's official news agency, Xinhua, was sentenced
to life imprisonment for selling an advance copy of a speech by Communist party
Secretary Jiang Zemin to a Hong Kong reporter.2  Chinese officials have since
launched a major propaganda campaign promising equally severe punishment to
anyone found guilty of "leaking state secrets." 28 2 A journalist for Ming Pao, a
Hong Kong Chinese-language newspaper, was seized in September 1993 by Chi-
nese security police and held incommunicado for eleven days before his arrest
was announced.283 The journalist, Xi Yang, was charged with stealing state secrets
and sentenced to twelve years in prison. Mr. Xi had filed a report with Ming
Pao regarding the People's Bank of China selling part of its gold reserves to get
foreign exchange.28 5 Mr. Xi's appeal was rejected by the Beijing High People's
Court on April 14, 1994.26 The press community in Hong Kong believes that
China is sending a clear message for them to behave themselves or face retribu-
287tion.
276. Peter Goodespeed, Hong Kong's Notions of Media Freedom Already Colliding with China's
Caution, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 4, 1993, at A21.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. Hong Kong is known as one of the most open publishing and communications centers
in Asia. Id. Hong Kong's population of six million people is served by 60 newspapers, two television
stations, three radio networks, dozens of magazines, five-channel satellite television, a fledgling
seven-channel cable system, and several international news organizations. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. The Xinhua news agency is understood to be the headquarters of the Chinese Communist
Party in Hong Kong. Ng, supra note 2, at 78 n.87. The director of Xinhua has always been both
Beijing's representative and the head of the Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong. Id.
282. Goodespeed, supra note 276, at A21.
283. Id.
284. Protesters Denounce China's Imprisonment of Colony Reporter, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr.
18, 1994, at 7 [hereinafter Protesters].
285. Goodespeed, supra note 276, at A21.
286. Protesters, supra note 284, at 7.
287. Goodespeed, supra note 276, at A21. In addition to instilling fear of criminal prosecution
and punishment, China has used economic clout to control the Hong Kong media. Id. Ming Pao
claims that Chinese officials are trying to control the placement of ads in the Hong Kong press. Id.
The newspaper reported that publications regarded as unfriendly to China are being blacklisted. Id.
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Fear of China's retribution is also a factor in Hong Kong politics. Martin
Barrow, a member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council, and an executive of the
British trading company Jardine Matheson Holdings Ltd., initially voiced strong
support for the democratic reforms proposed by Governor Patten. 211 "But after
months of intense pressure from China, Mr. Barrow had indicated that he would
vote against Mr. Patten." 28 9 In the end, Mr. Barrow abstained from voting on
the democratic reform bill. 21 Many Hong Kong businessmen have huge invest-
ments in China and do not want to risk upsetting Beijing.29' China can easily
apply the same tactics against business executives that do not adhere to the Com-
munist Party mandates as it does against journalists. Many of these same business-
men hope to become the new ruling elite in Hong Kong after 1997.292
D. U.S. POLICY REGARDING HONG KONG
The United States has lent support to Hong Kong's promised autonomy follow-
ing 1997 through the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992.293 The United States
maintains that the terms of the Joint Declaration should be strictly interpreted.294
To this end, the United States has pledged to "play an active role, before, on,
and after July 1, 1997, in maintaining Hong Kong's confidence and prosperity,
Hong Kong's role as an international financial center, and the mutually beneficial
ties between the people of the United States and the people of Hong Kong.,
295
The Act states that the United States should continue to treat Hong Kong as a
territory completely autonomous from China in all areas of trade and econom-
ics. 296 The Act further provides that the laws of the United States will continue
to apply to Hong Kong after 1997 in the same manner in which they currently
apply and that all treaties and international agreements between Hong Kong and
the United States will continue in force.297
As Congressman Porter noted when the Act was before the U.S. House of
Representatives, the guarantees of autonomy for Hong Kong are meaningless
It also reproduced two memos from the Bank of China advising all companies owned or controlled
by China that they are under strict orders not to advertise in eight blacklisted Hong Kong newspapers
and 11 magazines. Ming Pao was one of the blacklisted newspapers. Id.
288. Wong, supra note 119, at 1.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Sun, supra note 112, at A16.
292. Id.
293. United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-383, 106 Stat. 1448 (1992)
(codified as 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5732).
294. "American pressure on the Chinese Government to adhere to the terms of the joint declaration
signed with Britain in 1984 could play an important role in preserving Hong Kong's current legal,
social, and political conditions." 138 CONG. REC. H8004 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1992) (statement of
Rep. Pelosi).
295. United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, supra note 293, § 101.
296. Id. § 103.
297. Id. § 201.
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unless other nations step forward and amend their laws to allow for continued
bilateral relations with Hong Kong after 1997.298 Had the United States not taken
any action, Hong Kong would stand to receive the same treatment as China
with regard to export controls and trade quotas. Applying the same treatment
indiscriminately to Hong Kong and China would deny Hong Kong access to
advanced American technology such as supercomputers that are used in banking
and other industries.2 9 In addition, before the Act was passed, the issue of whether
the United States could recognize different MFN status for Hong Kong and China
was unclear, even though Hong Kong is a member of the GATT.3 °
While the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act goes to great lengths to state that Hong
Kong will be treated as a separate autonomous entity by the United States, it
includes references as to how Hong Kong's status may be threatened. The Act
acknowledges that treaties and international agreements are valid "unless or until
terminated in accordance with law. 30 1 The United States will continue to fulfill
its obligations to Hong Kong under international agreements "so long as Hong
Kong reciprocates. 30 2 The Act also provides that if the President of the United
States determines that Hong Kong is not sufficiently autonomous to justify being
treated differently from China, the President may issue an executive order sus-
pending application of U.S. law.30 3 The Act states that when making such a
determination, the President should consider the terms, obligations, and expecta-
tions expressed in the Joint Declaration.' °
The Act also requires that the Secretary of State report to Congress every two
years on conditions in Hong Kong. The report is to describe any significant
development that affects U.S. interests, including the development of democratic
institutions in Hong Kong.30 5
IV. The Forecast
A. KEEPING THE GOLDEN GOOSE LAYING EGGS
"It must not be forgotten that Hong Kong's very existence is due to the need
for a neutral point of contact between East and West," says one Hong Kong
resident. 3° If China adheres to its policy of "one country, two systems," then
Hong Kong will continue to prosper in the same role it has always played.3 7
Many optimists have surmised that China needs Hong Kong's economic prowess
298. 138 CONG. REC. H8003 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1992) (statement of Rep. Porter).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, supra note 293, § 201.
302. Id. § 102.
303. Id. § 202.
304. Id.
305. Id. § 301.
306. Greenway, supra note 118, at 14.
307. Id.
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so badly that they would not risk killing the golden goose by tampering with its
current system. Some observers have gone so far as to state that Hong Kong is
actually taking over China. In response to concern that China may expropriate
businesses' property, one Hong Kong executive scoffed that "China is not going
to take over Hong Kong. . . . Hong Kong is already taking over south China.
A new [Asian] 'dragon' is being created, and this one is going to be the mother
of all dragons." 30 8 As William H. Overholt, executive director at the Hong Kong
office of Bankers Trust Company pointed out: "If [China] intended to take that
stuff for free in '97, or at greatly reduced prices, they wouldn't buy it now.
. . . Also, they know that all they would have to do is expropriate one little piece
of property, and the value of everything they had bought would plummet. 3 09
Many business executives are willing to take a risk on doing business in Hong
Kong because of the vast potential offered by the possibility of China's loosening
of market controls. An important factor is the synergy between Hong Kong
and South China.310 "South China now has the fastest-growing economy among
industrialized nations, and its special economic zones have become the manufac-
turing centre for the world. Hong Kong has aided and fed off that boom, to the
point where the economic boundary between the two Chinas is non-existent.', 3.
Guangdong province is one of China's special economic zones (SEZs) where
Beijing allows the establishment of privately owned businesses." 2 Guangdong's
economy is expanding year after year at double-digit rates and is helping fuel
the boom in Hong Kong.31 3 Currently, 20 percent of Hong Kong's banknotes
circulate in Guangdong.31 4 Estimates show that Hong Kong companies employ
3 million workers in 25,000 factories on the mainland.31 5 A typical Hong Kong
shirt company, for example, will design, market, ship, bank, and insure in Hong
Kong while sewing and finishing the shirts in Guangdong province.31 6 Wages in
308. Blustein, supra note 164, at A22 (quoting Gary D. Gilbert, Chairman, Asia Terminals,
Ltd.).
309. Id.
310. Neoh, supra note 1, at 321,
311. McMartin, supra note 210, at B1.
312. Blustein, supra note 168, at A22. When China moved toward an open-door policy, a law
was passed that allowed the SEZs. Park, supra note 143, at 51. SEZs were established in Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, and Shantou, all located in Guangdong province, as well as in Xiamen in Fujian province.
Later, Hainan Island was designated as the fifth SEZ. Id. Special incentives are in place to encourage
foreign investment and trade. Id. For example, local foreign trade corporations and private firms
engaged in exporting are normally allowed to retain 25% of their foreign exchange earnings, but
in the SEZs the foreign exchange retention rights are greater. Id. Perhaps encouraged by the success
of the SEZs, China declared 14 cities along its Pacific coastline open for foreign direct investment
and technology in 1984. Id. Then in 1985 China opened up three huge delta areas. Id. It appears
that China is opening up the entire Pacific basin to attract the in-flow of foreign investment and
technology. Id.
313. Blustein, supra note 168, at A22.
314. Paul S.P. Hsu, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China: The Chinese Productivity Triangle, 27
INT'L LAW. 523, 528 (1993).
315. Id.
316. Blustein, supra note 168, at A22.
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Guangdong are one-fifth to one-tenth the rate of Hong Kong wages. 317 The shift
of low-cost labor into Guangdong is creating higher-paying jobs for Hong Kong,
and this trend is expected to continue after 1997.318
The integration of China's resources offers unrivaled potential.31 9 Capitalists
hope that eventually all of China, not just the provinces across Hong Kong's
border, will become more open and market oriented. Businesses are positioning
themselves to cash in on a potential explosion of industry and enterprise.32 °
In contrast to the view that China will continue to integrate resources and unify
into one big open market, a private forecasting group has predicted that China
will break up into about a dozen autonomous regions within five years. They
advise U.S. companies to "remain nimble" and focus on selling services rather
than installing new plants or equipment in the region. 321 The forecast suggested
that the breakup will be triggered by the death of Deng Xiaoping, the leader of
China's central government.322
B. PLUCKING THE GOLDEN GOOSE'S FEATHERS
China's response to the democratic reforms proposed by Governor Patten
have caused many people to temper their optimism. The fact that China held up
financing for Hong Kong's new airport for years, and continues to hold up a
much needed container terminal, suggests that China has already plucked a few
feathers from the golden goose.323
Doing business with Hong Kong in the period leading up to 1997 is a risk.324
However, many business leaders are willing to take the risk in order to position
themselves to take advantage of the vast opportunities that China offers. 325 As
one commentator stated, the worst case scenario is one in which Hong Kong
becomes just another Chinese city with no special status. 326 If this happens "the
risk in investing in Hong Kong is no greater than investing in China, and there
are so many reasons for investing in China.327
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See Park, supra note 143, at 51.
320. Blustein, supra note 168, at Al.
321. Also in the News-General Developments, 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1180 (July 14, 1993).
322. Id. Although Deng Xiaoping relinquished his last formal leadership position four years ago,
he still wields great power in China. Daniel Southerland, Frail Deng Makes Appearance on TV,
WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1994, at A18. Deng is rarely seen in public and most observers think that
he is in bad health. Id. China's economic reform and open-door policy have been led by Deng. See
Park, supra note 140, at 51. Uncertainty exists as to whether the reformists will be able to retain
their political power and continue the reforms in the absence of Deng. Id.
323. Greenway, supra note 118, at 14.
324. Holberton & Harverson, supra note 169, at 17.
325. Id.
326. Greenway, supra note 118, at 14.
327. Id. China's current economic boom began in about 1978 and has resulted in real annual
growth averaging approximately 9% each year since. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Rise of China, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 1993, at 59, 63. If China's economy continues to grow at its present rate,
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Moody's Investors Service has said that Hong Kong is likely to lose its status
as a world-class financial center after 1997.328 The agency fears that China will
be unable to resist the temptation to meddle after the handover.32 9 Banks such
as the venerable Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank have created escape hatches for
their assets by setting up holding companies in other countries.33°
Hong Kong is extremely useful to China as an entry point for technology,
capital, management skills, and ideas.33' Hong Kong is a major financial banking
center, has fund management and capital raising capability, is a regional headquar-
ters for multi-nationals, and is the tourist center for Asia. 332 But one cannot ignore
the reality of the situation as well as lessons learned from the past. China has
long felt a historical mission to regain sovereignty over Hong Kong.333 Although
the Joint Declaration promises a high degree of autonomy, recent events have
shown that China has no intent to give Hong Kong free reign over its own destiny.
Indeed, China's whole system of governance is based on control and central
planning. China is willing to loosen its control mechanisms to gain economic
status. However, it would be foolhardy to think that it is willing to relinquish
control altogether. As Governor Patten observed, "[h]istory is littered with the
carcasses of decapitated geese.314
V. Conclusion
Siu-lun Wong, Professor of Sociology at Hong Kong University, addressing
the issue of Hong Kong being transferred to China in 1997:
China may displace the United States in the first half of the 21st century as the largest economy in
the world. Id. at 59. According to World Bank projections, China's net imports in the year 2002
will be $639 billion, compared to $521 billion for Japan. Id. at 61. Using these same projections,
China will have a gross domestic product of $9.8 trillion in the year 2002, compared to $9.7 trillion
for the United States. Id.
328. Stamp, supra note 147.
329. Id. Moody's Investors Service has recently announced that it might cut the rating of Hong
Kong's biggest borrower, Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC). David Stamp, Agency May
Cut Rating for HK's Biggest Borrower, REUTER EUR. Bus. REP., Oct. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS,
World Library, REUEUB File. Moody's reported that it would review MTRC's Aa2 rating for
borrowings made in Hong Kong dollars for a possible downgrading. Id. Ratings from Moody's and
rival company Standard and Poor's Corporation are important for big borrowers. Id. Low ratings
usually mean that the borrower has to pay a higher interest rate, reflecting the greater risk for lenders.
Id. The agency cited concern over the degree of financial autonomy Hong Kong will keep after the
1997 return to China. Id. Moody's acknowledged that as a Special Administrative Region Hong
Kong is expected to maintain a significant degree of autonomy from China, but stated "the ultimate
sovereign power over the territory's institutions-including the monetary and financial framework-
will reside with China." Id. Bankers have noted that Moody's review will cover only local currency
borrowing, but expressed concern that any downgrading might affect foreign investors psychologically
by making them more cautious in lending to the MTRC. Id.
330. Blustein, supra note 168, at A22.
331. Neoh, supra note 1, at 321.
332. Id.
333. Neoh, supra note 1, at 315.
334. Greenway, supra note 118, at 14.
VOL. 29, NO. 1
HONG KONG'S REVERSION TO THE PRC 207
Will Hong Kong lose its developmental momentum as it approaches 1997? My analysis
* . .would indicate that as long as the institutional principles essential to its past economic
success are upheld, the relevant cultural factors can be expected to continue to fuel the
engine of development. In the pursuit of modernity, is Hong Kong a model for the rest
of China? The debate is open, but at least one thing is clear. Hong Kong stands as a
concrete example of how modernization with distinctive Chinese characteristics can be
attained."'
China probably will not make any immediate or drastic changes in Hong Kong's
capitalist way of life. More likely is that China's government will begin to make
slow, creeping changes to assimilate Hong Kong into the rest of China.336 Chinese
authorities have already stated that they intend to make the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region part of a unified socialist China. 3 7 Chinese leaders may
have every intent of accomplishing this goal without damaging Hong Kong's
tremendous financial and industrial assets, but it seems certain that Hong Kong
will feel the effect. China may not purposely kill the golden goose, but it may
unintentionally smother it. 338
335. Neoh, supra note 1, at 312 (quoting and citing to Siu-lun Wong, Modernisation and Chinese
Culture in Hong Kong, 1806 CHINA Q. 306, 324-25 (1986)).
336. Miller, supra note 115, at At.
337. Keller, supra note 2, at 390.
338. The reference is to a remark by Christine Loh, a member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council,
quoted in Miller, supra note 115, at Al.
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